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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT IN
MINNESOTA 50

S

By DONALD E. BRIDGMAN 5 '

four states substantially the pre-existing law in Minnesota, as in the majority of states. It is as follows:
"Section 4. [Conveyances by Insolvent.] Every conveyance
made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will
be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without
regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration."
ECTION

A small number of states5 2 still follow the doctrine of Reade

v. Livingston, that if a person has any debts, although he has
sufficient assets remaining to meet his debts, and is not insolvent,
yet a voluntary conveyance is constructively fraudulent; and in
such states the Uniform Act will produce an important change.
Under Minnesota's former statute 4 this doctrine has never been
the law in this state.5 This statute stated that fraudulent intent
should be a question of fact. However, the cases have held that
where a person is insolvent and makes a voluntary conveyance,
the necessary effect of his act is to defraud creditors, and the
debtor will be presumed to have intended this necessary effect.56
Section 4 of the Uniform Act says that in such case the conveyance is fraudulent regardless of intent. This is a better method
of reaching a similar result, since the act itself states the rule,
without requiring a stretching by judicial construction. Furthermore, the decisions are in some confusion because the rule of
presumptive fraud is not stated in all cases the same; and the
Uniform Act introduces desirable certainty in the matter.
5OFor
first installment of the article see 7 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 453.
51
Minneapolis, Minn. Chairman of Committee on Uniform State Laws
of Minnesota
Bar Association.
52
Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 207; 27 C.J. 547.
1',"(1818) 3 John Ch. (N.Y.) 481.
3554Minn.. G.S. 1913 sec. 7015.
Filley v. Register, (1860) 4 Minn. 391 (296).
56
f Henry v. Hinman, (1878) 25 Minn. 199; Walsh v. Byrnes, (1888)
39 Minn. 527, 40 N.V. 831; McCord v. Knowlton, (1900) 79 Minn. 299,
82 N.W. 589; Underleak v. Scott, (1912) 117 Minn. 136, 141, 134 N.W.
731; Thysell v. McDonald, (1916) 134 Minn. 400, 159 N.W. 958, Ann.
Cas. 1917C 1015; Dunnell's Digest, sec. 3873.
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It seems that the word "creditors" used without qualification
in this section, denotes present or existing creditors, although not
expressly so stated. Thus in section 5, "creditors" is used to
denote present creditors as distinguished from "other persons
who become creditors," and in sections 6 and 7, "future creditors" are specifically mentioned. This corresponds to the former
law .in Minnesota and in most states, where a voluntary conveyance by an insolvent, presumptively fraudulent as to existing
creditors, is not fraudulent as to future creditors, in the absence
of fraudulent intent,5 7 although there is authority in some few
states to the effect that subsequent creditors can also set aside
such a conveyance, even without actual intent to defraud being
58
present.
ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS

What about the validity as to creditors under the Uniform
Act of assignments for benefit of creditors? This subject contains a number of rules of law as to what clauses in such
assignments make them conclusively or presumptively fraudulent
and what do not. There is no special provision in the act for
these assignments for creditors; and it would therefore seem
necessary to apply the general rules laid down in the various
sections. Inasmuch as a debtor can easily employ an assignment for creditors to secure substantial benefits for himself, and
seriously delay his creditors, the courts have been inclined to
tolerate such an assignment only if it is so worded as to secure a
sale of the debtor's assets without delay and a distribution of
the proceeds to apply on his debts. Clauses authorizing the
trustee to carry on the business,50 permitting the debtor to remain
in possession, or requiring releases from the creditors 0 (except
under the insolvency act) or otherwise calculated to benefit the
debtor rather than the creditors, rendered such assignments
fraudulent.8
But an assignment made in good faith by an insolvent in trust to sell the property promptly and distribute the
proceeds pro rata among all the creditors was permitted," since,
57
Walsh v. Byrnes, (1888) 39 Minn. 527, 40 N.W. 831; Sovell v.
Lincoln County, (1915) 129 Minn. 356. 152 N.W. 727; Coulter v. Mein-

ing, 58(1919) 143 Minn. 104, 172 N.W. 910; 27 C.J. 555.

Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 102, 103 note; 27 C.J. 524.
59Truitt
v. Caldwell, (1859) 3 Minn. 364 (257).
0
6 May v. Walker, (1886) 35 Minn. 194, 28 N.W. 252; McConnell v.
Rakness,
(1889) 41 Minn. 3,42 N.W. 539.
1

62Gere v. Murray, (1861) 6 Minn. 305, (215, 221, 222.)
6 Gere v. Murray, (1861) 6 Minn. 305 (215, 223); McClung v. Berg-

feld, (1860) 4 Minn. 148 (99).
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though it might delay some one creditor who was about to attach
or levy execution, it was calculated to get a better price and
secure a more equitable distribution of the assets, and to prove
more beneficial to creditors as a class than if they commenced
each one for himself to bring suit or to try and secure a preference.
It would seem that under sections 3 and 4 of the Uniform
Act all assignments for benefit of creditors leaving the debtor
without assets to meet his debts, would be fraudulent and could
be set aside by any non-assenting creditor, because of lack of
"fair consideration." There is no transfer of property, or satisfaction of antecedent debts to constitute "fair consideration"
under section 3 (a) unless in connection with the assignment,
sufficient creditors release their debts to constitute a fair equivalent. Nor does there seem to be "fair consideration" under
section 3 (b) for an assignment in trust to sell for benefit of
creditors, since the words "to secure an antecedent debt," would
naturally refer to a mortgage or pledge of property, where the
debtor has a beneficial interest or equity that creditors may reach.
The courts are inclined to treat a conveyance in trust to sell and
pay debts as something quite different from a mortgage.
If, however, it should be held that there is "fair consideration" for an assignment in trust for benefit of creditors, then
the validity of such assignments would apparently turn on the
existence of actual intent to defraud under section 7 of the
Uniform Act, and the various clauses formerly making such
assignments void would appear to be evidence or presumptive
evidence of fraudulent intent because they have the effect to
defraud.

63

While the Uniform Act changes the law, if it declares assignments for benefit of creditors void as to creditors in the absence
of sufficient release of debts, yet the practical importance of
such a change would not seem to be very great. At present,
making a general assignment for benefit of creditors is an act
of bankruptcy ;64 and creditors can upset such an assignment, if
they do not regard it as fair and beneficial, by throwing the
debtor into bankruptcy. If such an assignment is fraudulent
under the Uniform Act, it simply gives the creditors another
63
1t is possible that it might be held that the Uniform Act does not
apply to assignments for benefit of creditors at all, and that the law on
the subject
remains unchanged.
64
Bankruptcy Act, sec. 3 a(4).
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alternative method of upsetting the assignment, the right to reach
and apply on their debts the property assigned.
"Section 5. [Conveyances by Persons in Business.] Every
conveyance made without fair consideration when the person
making it is engaged or is about to engage in a business or
transaction for which the property remaining in his hands after
the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent as
to creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during
the continuance of such business or transaction without regard
to his actual intent."
This section states a case of constructive fraud against both
present and future creditors. That is, the conveyance is fraudulent regardless of actual intent. It is to be noted that not all
conveyances without fair consideration are fraudulent under the
section when a person is engaging in a hazardous business. He
may give away his property, providing he does not leave an
unreasonably small capital remaining.
The section appears to state the weight of authority " and
probably represents the former law in Minnesota, although there
seem to be no cases in this state on the point. There are cases
in Minnesota laying down the rule that if the effect of a conveyance
is to defraud subsequent creditors it is void as to them,
that intent to defraud subsequent creditors may be implied,
which will serve the same as actual intent.66 Doubtless the Minnesota court would have held that a conveyance by one in a hazardous business leaving him with too small a capital, implied an
intent to defraud both present and subsequent creditors, which is
the result reached in most states, and in effect the same as the
Uniform Act. In regard to making such a conveyance, Jessel,
M. R. said in a leading case :6?
"The grantor virtually says: 'If I succeed in business, I make
a fortune for myself. If I fail, I leave my creditors unpaid.
They will bear the loss.' That is the very thing which the Statute
of Elizabeth was meant to prevent."
"Section 6. [Conveyances by a Person about to Incur Debts.]
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without
fair consideration when the person making the conveyance or
entering into the obligation intends or believes that he will incur
65
Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 103 note, 114, 115, 231, et seq.;
Glenn, Creditors' Rights and Remedies sec. 169; 27 C.J. 522.
°OGallagher v. Rosenfield, (1891) 47 Minn. 507, 510, 50 N.W. 696;
Fullington v. N. W. Importers' Ass'n, (1892) 48 'Minn. 490. 51 N.W.
475, 31 A.S.R. 663; Williams v. Kemper, (1906) 99 Minn. 301, 1"09 N.W. 242.
67Ex parte Russell, (1882) L.R. 19 Ch. D. 588.
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debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent
as to both present and future creditors."
It is to be noted that this section, in contrast to the two
preceding sections, requires a state of mind in the debtor, but
that belief that he will incur debts beyond ability to pay, makes
the conveyance fraudulent as well as intent to incur debts and
to convey the property so as not to pay them. There has been
considerable doubt as to the law on the matter,68 and there appear
to have been no cases in Minnesota directly in point. Under
this section, if a person of extravagant habits, who believes he is
likely to incur debts, settles his property on members of his
family so that the property may be protected from his creditors
in case he does incur such debts, the settlement is fraudulent
and void as to future creditors, although the primary intent of
the debtor is to provide for his family against the likelihood of
his incurring debts. A spendthrift may not thus put his property
beyond the reach of his creditors. Indeed, the section goes further, and declares that the conveyance is fraudulent, regardless
of the intent of the spendthrift in making it, if he believes he
will incur debts he cannot pay. The section clears up a doubtful
point, and probably makes some change in the law.
There is authority to the effect that where there is secrecy
in the conveyance, and the debtor remains in apparent ownership
so that future creditors would likely be misled, the conveyance
is fraudulent as to future creditors, without actual intent.6 0 But
such a situation is not covered by the Uniform Act as a case
of constructive fraud, and it would seem to be governed by
section 7 on actual intent, and by the rules of estoppel under
section 11.
"Section 7. [Conveyance Made with Intent to Defraud.]
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder,
delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent
as to both present and future creditors."
This section provides that where there is actual intent to
hinder, delay or defraud, etc., the conveyance is fraudulent, as
distinguished from cases described in sections 4, 5, 6 and 8, where
the conveyance is fraudulent without actual intent. This section
is the same as the Statute of Elizabeth; and as far as it goes it
6827 C.J. 521, 522; Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 237.

09
Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 103 note; Glenn, Creditors' Rights
and Remedies sec. 170.
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states the existing law. However, in all states the Statute of
Elizabeth has been construed to render certain conveyances
fraudulent where there was no actual fraudulent intent; and to
that extent it goes beyond this section. Such conveyances, fraudulent without intent, are covered by sections 4, 5, 6 and 8. It
would seem under the Uniform Act that cases of constructive
fraud must be limited to conveyances covered by those four
sections, and that any conveyances which are not within those
sections, but which have been held in the past to be fraudulent
regardless of intent, would fall within section 7, and that actual
intent must be shown.
71
7 0
The rules as to badges of fraud, and other rules of evidence
as to how fraudulent intent can be shown, would remain the
same under this section as formerly; and it might well be that
the court would continue to hold that where the necessary effect
of the debtor's act is to defraud creditors, this is presumptive
evidence of his fraudulent intent. But the rule that certain
facts constitute conclusive and irrebuttable evidence of fraudulent
intent, when such rule is really used to mean that the conveyance
is fraudulent regardless of actual intent, would seem to be
abolished. However, the doctrine that a man is liable for the
necessary effect of his acts, and that he must be held to intend
what a reasonable man under the circumstances would intend,
has a strong hold on the courts; and it will be an interesting
question to see whether or not a set of rules as to constructive
fraud is built up under this section.
It is to be noted that it is the intent of the debtor which is
referred to in this section. The protection of a purchaser for
fair consideration who had no knowledge of the fraud at the
time of purchase, is provided for in section 9.
The rules have already been referred to under sections 1 and
3, that a conveyance of exempt property, or a conveyance to
pay a debt to one creditor operating as a preference, are not
fraudulent, no matter what is the actual intent of the debtor.
In one important particular, this section changes the former
law in Minnesota. Although there is an expression to the contrary in an early Minnesota case, 2 yet the subsequent cases 73
7ODunnell's Digest, sec. 3914; 27 C.J. 483-497.
7'Dunnell's Digest, sec. 3910 et seq.; 27 C.J. 785 et seq.
v. Byrnes, (1888) 39 Minn. 527, 40 N.W. 831.
7 Union National Bank v. Pray, (1890) 44 Minn. 168. 46 N.W. 304;
Fullington v. N. W. Importers' Ass'n, (1892) 48 Minn. 490, 51 N.W. 475,
31 A.S.R. 663; Coulter v. Meining, (1919) 143 Minn. 104, 172 N.W. 910.
72
Walsh
3
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establish the rule that actual intent to defraud present or existing
creditors is not sufficient to render a conveyance fraudulent as
to subsequent creditors, that if the conveyance is attacked by
subsequent or future creditors it is necessary to show intent to
defraud subsequent creditors as distinguished from existing
creditors. This is changed in the Uniform Act, which declares
that intent to defraud either present or future creditors renders
the conveyance fraudulent as to both. The states have been
divided squarely on the point,74 one group adopting the rule laid
down in the Uniform Act, and another group the rule formerly
found in Minnesota. The Act will produce uniformity on the
point; and under it a conveyance is fraudulent as to a future
creditor, if there was intent to defraud a present creditor. Apparently any creditor, present or future, may take advantage of
an intent to hinder, delay or defraud any other creditor. There
is much to be said for this rule. In nearly every case where a
debtor makes a conveyance with intent to defraud one creditor,
he either intends also to defraud creditors generally, or such is
the necessary effect of the conveyance. The assets available for
creditors have been decreased by the conveyance. Nevertheless,
it is frequently very difficult or impossible by the nature of the
case to secure evidence, which must be largely circumstantial,
to show actual intent to defraud some particular creditor or
class of creditors.
"Section 8. [Conveyance of Partnership Property.] Every
conveyance of partnership property and every partnership obligation incurred when the partnership is or will be thereby rendered
creditors, if the conveyinsolvent, is fraudulent as to partnership
75
ance is made or obligation is incurred,
"(a) To a partner, whether with or without a promise by
him to pay partnership debts, or
"(b) To a person not a partner without fair consideration to
the partnership as distinguished from consideration to the individual partners."
The section is to be read in connection with section 2 which
defines when there is insolvency in case of a partnership.
There appear to be no cases in Minnesota on the points involved; and the cases in other states are in disagreement and
confusion."6 The section clears up the doubt on an important
matter.
7427 CJ. 523, 524; Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances, 85-117, esp.
103 note.
75
The act as printed in Minn., Laws, 1921 ch. 415, has a period instead
of a comma at this point, by some mistake.
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For both this act and the Uniform Partnership Act, Prof.
William Draper Lewis of the University of Pennsylvania was
draftsman; and the above section is worded to harmonize with
the Partnership Act, which is also in force in Minnesota."
It is to be noted that the section only covers certain conveyances by a partnership which are constructively fraudulent, and
that the preceding sections also apply to conveyances by a partnership.
"Section 9. [Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have
Matured.] (1) Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent
as to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, may,
as against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration
without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase, or
one who has78 derived title immediately or mediately from such
a purchaser,
"(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled
to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim, or
"(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution
upon the property conveyed.
"(2) A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has
given less than a fair consideration for the conveyance or obligation, may retain the property or obligation as security for repayment."
This section raises a number of important points which may
perhaps best be discussed under the following headings,--what
creditors may proceed to reach the property fraudulently conveyed, when may the creditor proceed for that purpose, against
whom may he proceed, how may he proceed, what property may
he reach, and what is the purchaser's right of reimbursement.
Just as with the preceding sections, the discussion in general is
to be understood as relating to the right to annul fraudulent
obligations as well as to reach property fraudulently conveyed,
although the annulling of obligations is not specifically mentioned. Of course, as to some matters, by their nature, such as
the right of attachment, the discussion would not apply to obligations created in fraud of creditors..
Who may Proceed to Reach Property Fraudulently Conyeved?
The section adopts the general rule in the United States that
only creditors as to whom a conveyance is fraudulent 9 may have
76See discussion and notes in 28 Harv. L. Rev. 774-777, and 29 Harv.

L.R.77296. 29&

Minn., Laws 1921, chap. 487.
There is a comma at this point in the official text of the uniform
act, 7which by mistake is printed as a period in Minn., Laws 1921, ch. 415.
0Sections 4 to 8 have stated the creditors as to whom various conveyances are fraudulent.
78
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it set aside,80 although in England and in some states the rule
seems to be that if a conveyance is fraudulent as to one creditor,
any other creditor may set it aside, at least if a creditor as to
whom it is fraudulent, remains unpaid."' In applying this section, however, section 7 must be borne in mind, which declares
that a conveyance with intent to defraud existing creditors is
fraudulent also as to subsequent creditors, thereby changing the
former Lule in Minnesota. The broad definition of "creditor"
in section 1, that a creditor is any one having any legal claim, is
also to be remembered.
It seems clear that assignees, personal representatives, heirs
and successors of creditors have the same right to reach property
fraudulently conveyed as have the original creditors, although they
are not specifically mentioned in the act as they were in the
Statute of Elizabeth and in the Minnesota statute. 2 The assignees
etc., of creditors stand in the shoes of the original creditors and
are creditors themselves. At common law they would have the
rights of the original creditors to reach the property fraudulently
conveyed ;83 and under section 11 the existing law continues in
force in matters not covered by the act. An illustration would
be where A gave his note to B and subsequently made a conveyance without fair consideration, while insolvent, fraudulent
under section 4 of the act; and B thereafter endorsed the note to
C. C, holder of the note, would have the same right to set aside
the conveyance as B. It is obvious, however, that where a claim
cannot be assigned or abates on the death of the owner, the
purported assignees, or personal representatives, having no right
to the claim, cannot set aside the conveyance as fraudulent.
The rights of trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, assignees for
benefit of creditors, executors and administrators and other representatives of debtors, to bring action to recover back property
fraudulently conveyed, for the benefit of creditors whose rights
they also represent, are not within the scope of the act. This
section describes the rights of creditors acting for themselves to
reach property fraudulently conveyed. It does not regulate the
8

Fullington v. N. W. Importers' Ass'n, (1892)

48 Minn. 490, 51

N.W. 475, 31 A.S.R. 663. The rule of this case, however, to the extent
that it holds that a conveyance with intent to defraud existing creditors

is not fraudulent as to subsequent creditors, is changed by sec. 7 of
the act.
8
Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 103 note; Glenn, Creditors' Rights
and 82
Remedies, sec. 160.
Minn., G.S. 1913, sec. 7014.
8327 C.J. 478; Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 105 note.
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right of the trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor or other representative of both debtor and creditors to recover back property
fraudulently conveyed, either in a plenary action for the benefit
of all creditors or in an action for the benefit of certain creditors.
In many cases, in order to secure equality of distribution among
creditors and to recover property for a trust estate, the bankruptcy trustee or other representative can secure the property
for the benefit of all creditors if the conveyance is fraudulent
as to any; while if the creditors bring actions as individuals,
only those as to whom the conveyance is fraudulent, may reach
the property under the above section. The existing statutes84
and common law in regard to the rights of trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, assignees for creditors and others as representing the debtor and creditors, s5 are not changed by the act.
When .may the Creditor Proceed? The act apparently makes
an important change in this matter. Under this section the only
prerequisite of the creditor's right not only to attach the property
fraudulently conveyed, but also to bring action to set aside the
conveyance, is that his claim shall have matured; and under
the next section a creditor whose claim has not even matured may
have the conveyance set aside. At common law,86 and in Minnesota prior to the passage of this act,8 7 it was necessary as a general
rule for a creditor to secure judgment on the debt due him before
an action would lie to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, though
there were some exceptions to the rule. Such an action was regarded as one in aid of a judgment. In apparently doing away
with this requirement of a judgment, and allowing the action
to set aside the conveyance to be brought at any time, this section
and the one succeeding, make an important change, but one
84
For instance, sec. 70a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, vests the trustee
with title to property transferred in fraud of creditors by the bankrupt;
secs. 7313 and 7314, Minn., G.S. 1913, provide, where the property of
the deceased available for payment of his debts is insufficient to pay them
in full, for the recovery by the executor or administrator of any property
disposed of by the deceased with intent to defraud creditors, or by conveyance which for any reason is void as to them; sec. 8332 Minn., G.S.
1913, provides that the assignee in a general assignment for creditors
shall represent the creditors as against all conveyances fraudulent as to
them. It is to be presumed that when the question under such statutes
is whether a certain conveyance is fraudulent, that the law of the state
on fraudulent conveyances, found in the Uniform Act, will be applied.
SSDunnell's Dizest, sec. 3898; Glenn, Creditors' Rights and Remedies,
sec. 321-3-29, 339-342, 358-359, 393-395, 401, 402-404.
8627 C.J. 727 et seq.; Glenn, Creditors' Rights and Remedies, sec. 73
et seq.
87
Dunnell', Digest. sec. 3923; Wadsworth v. Schisselbauer, (1884) 32
Minn. 84, 19 N.W. 390.
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which has a number of advantages, in avoiding great and unnecessary delay and circuity of action.
It is argued in a review of the Uniform Act appearing in
the Columbia Law Review, 88 that no sound doctrine has allowed
the simple creditor to attack a conveyance as fraudulent, and
that section 9, in connection with section 11, providing that
"the rules of law and equity including the law merchant . . .
shall govern" in cases not provided for in the act, should be
construed as requiring by implication that a judgment must be
obtained before the creditor may "have the conveyance set aside
or obligation annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his
claim." The reviewer further states that section 10 should not
be taken according to its words, as allowing a creditor of an unmatured claim to proceed generally to set aside a conveyance,
but should also be construed so as to follow substantially the
common law.
Under such a view of their meaning, sections 9 and 10 would
produce practically no change in the law. But there are important considerations leading one to the contrary view, and to
believe that the sections are to be construed according to the
natural and apparent meaning of the words: first, the view that
judgment on the debt must first be secured, renders section 10
meaningless; second, there are a number of important practical
advantages in not requiring a judgment before the action to set
aside the conveyance; third, in about one-third of the states there
have been statutes in force for many years, doing away with
the need of first securing judgment, and it is natural to suppose
that the rule in these states was adopted in the uniform act as
working better in practice; fourth, in the other states, there have
been a number of important exceptions to the rule requiring
judgment, so that there is nothing extraordinary or untried about
bringing the action to set aside before judgment is secured. On
account of the importance of the matter, these points will be
discussed in more detail.
First, it is obvious that section 9, construed in connection
with section 10, means that any creditor whose claim has matured, may proceed to have the conveyance set aside, and not
merely a judgment creditor. Under section 10, a creditor whose
claim has not matured may so proceed; and such a creditor
would not have secured a judgment. What meaning can section
8

Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 20 Col. L. Rev. 339.
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10 have if it requires judgment to proceed? It is not reasonable
to suppose that it was intended by section 10 to permit a creditor
whose claim had not matured, to proceed without judgment,
and at the same time not to permit a creditor with a matured
claim to proceed under section 9, unless he had secured judgment. The two sections appear to be parallel and subject to like
construction as regards the requirement of judgment.
Second, if the creditor need not wait for judgment, he can
proceed at once to set aside the conveyance at the same time that
he sues on the debt; and instead of waiting for two cases to be
brought on and tried, one after the other, the cases would be
on the calendar at the same time. The time necessary to realize
on the debt would be cut in half. Probably the debt and the
fraudulent conveyance would be tried in one case, with two
defendants. 89 Inasmuch as debtors who convey property in
fraud of creditors frequently desire to cause the creditors as
much delay and expense as possible, any change of procedure
which reduces the delay has a strong point in its favor. An example of the delay under the former rule is the ordinary case
of a fraudulent conveyance of real property. The creditor would
sue on the debt and attach the property. On recovering judgment he could sell on execution; but it would be impossible in
most instances to secure a satisfactory price to satisfy his debt,
since subsequent litigation is necessary to determine the question
of a fraudulent transfer, and therefore title.90 He would, therefore, commence an action to set aside the conveyance after obtaining judgment on the debt. It saves great delay and circuity
of action to be able to bring and try the two actions at once.
If the property was not fraudulently conveyed, it is an advantage
to the owner to have the matter disposed of with less delay, since
the property is tied up from the date of the original attachment.
Third, some eighteen states have realized the advantages to be
gained from doing away with the requirement that judgment on
the debt precede the action to set aside the conveyance, and have
abolished the requirement by statute. These statutes vary considerably in form.9"
C.J. 736. note 39.
See Brasie v. Mpls. Brewing Co., (1902), 87 Minn. 456, 92 N.W.
340, 94 A.S.R. 709, 67 L.R.A. 865.
D1For statement of the statutes see 14 A. & E. Encyc., 2nd. ed., 319
note, and 5 Encyc. P1. & Pr. 475 note. See also 27 C.J. 735, 736; 12
R.C.L. 631.
8927
90
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Fourth, the courts of states, not having such statutes, have
realized the hardship of requiring judgment, and have permitted
the action to set aside -fraudulent conveyances in many cases
without first securing judgment." 2 Thus, where the debtor has
absconded, or is a non-resident, the court does not ask that personal judgment be first secured against him on the debt, as this
would require going to another state or be impossible. 3 Also,
many states permit an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance in aid of an attachment lien, without first securing judgment 4 Again, a judgment creditor may bring a creditor's bill
to set aside a fraudulent coniveyance in behalf also of other
creditors who may join him, who have not recovered judgments ;95
and trustees, receivers, executors and others representing creditors
are constantly suing to set aside conveyances, where some or all
of the creditors have not recovered judgments. In England and
Canada a simple creditor can bring a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, thereby preventing the grantee from dealing
with the property.98
For the above reasons it would seem that the uniform act
is to be construed as permitting a creditor to sue to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance, without first securing judgment, and that
the argument that such procedure is so contrary to existing practice and policy that the act must at all hazards be stretched in
its construction to avoid it, is unsound and not true to fact.
In case the courts construe the uniform act as not requiring
the creditor to first secure judgment, there are several matters
to note. Although the statutes to a similar effect above referred
92
For discussion of the matter generally see 27 C.J. 729-734; 12 R.C.L.
629-631;
14 A. & E. Encyc., 2nd. ed., 318, 329; 1 Ann. Cas. 629 note.
93
Overmire v. Haworth, (1892) 48 Minn. 372, 51 N.W. 121, 31 A.S.R.
660; 27 C.J. 731; 5 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 523.
9427 C.J. 733:12 R.C.L. 629; 5 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 525; See Bruce v.
Hoidal, (1912) 119 Minn. 362, 138 NAV. 313.
9527 C J. 729.
9627 C.J. 729.
The right of the creditor to interfere with the property fraudulently
conveyed before he has established his debt at law, is recognized in his
right to attach. if he may attach, why may he not also sue to set aside
the conveyance and save time? This is in substance the procedure in
garnishment under sec. 7870, Minn., G.S. 1913. Sec. 7889, Minn., G.S.
1913, giving a creditor the right to enjoin the debtor from disposing of
his property fraudulently pending the suit on the debt, is an example of
a remedial statute giving a right not recognized at common law. See 5
Encyc. P1. & Pr. 473.
Note the right in some states of the creditor having a subsequent lien
by mortgage, etc., to set aside the conveyance without procuring judgment,
27 C.J. 734. One holding a junior chattel mortgage may attach a senior
chattel mortgage as fraudulent*without first procuring judgment.
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to have been liberally construed as remedial legislation in the
states where passed,9 7 yet they are without effect as affecting
equity procedure in the federal courts. 8 Again, if the Fraudulent Conveyance Act applies to chattel mortgages as well as
section 6966 General Statutes 1913, and to conveyances to a
third person, where the debtor furnishes the consideration to
the grantor, as well as section 6707, General Statutes 1913, then
an action can be brought under the uniform act to set aside such
a mortgage or conveyance by a simple creditor before judgment
has been secured, which does not appear possible under those
sections.99
It is also important to note the effect that the uniform act
would have on the statute of limitations, if it gives the right to
bring action to set aside the fraudulent conveyance without first
securing judgment. Formerly the statutory period of six years
did not begin to run until judgment was secured and docketed in
the county where the land lay, although the fraud had been discovered before, because the judgment was a prerequisite to bringing the action. 100 But now it would appear that once the creditor
has a claim the statute commences to run as soon as the fraud
has been discovered;11 and it has been so held in states where
02
by statute the action may be commenced before judgment.
075 Encyc. P1. & Pr. 476; 27 C.J. 736; Jones v. Smith, (1890) 92 Ala.
455, 9 So. 179.
9827 C.J. 737; Scott v. Neely, (1891) 140 U.S. 106, 35 L. Ed. 358, 11
S.C.R.
712, 727.
9
In general under section 6707, Minn., G.S. 1913, a simple creditor
must secure a judgment before he can sue to establish a trust in the
property; Gorton v. Massey, (1866) 12 Minn. 145, (83); 27 C.J. 730.
In regard to chattel mortgages it is important to distinguish between
rules stating as to what creditors the mortgage is void or fraudulent,
and rules stating when a creditor as to whom the mortgage is void, may
bring action to set it aside. It is one of the former rules, which in
Minnesota declares that a chattel mortgage is void because not filed only
as to creditors who have secured a lien on the property. Goldberg v.
Brule Timber Co., (1918) 140 Minn. 335, 337, 168 N.W. 22, and cases
there cited. However, such a mortgage has been held void as to simple
creditors because fraudulent, Coykendall v. Ladd, (1884) 32 Minn. 529,
21 N.W. 733; Citizens State Bank v. Brown, (1910) 110 Minn. 176, 124
N.W. 990; and under the definition of "creditor" in section 1 of the
Uniform Act, there would be no distinction between simple creditors and
creditors with a lien, in determining as to whom the chattel mortgage
was fraudulent.
100
Rounds v. Green, (1882) 29 Minn. 139, 12 N.W. 454.
' 0'Duxbury v. Boice, (1897) 70 Minn. 113, 72 N.W. 838. Question
whether the rule of Brasie v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., (1902) 87 Minn.
456, 93 NA. 520, 97 A.S.R. 538, that statute runs from date of sale,
where real property is sold on execution and ejectment suit brought to
determine whether conveyance was fraudulent, would continue to apply
to cases
of sale on execution.
102Combs v. Watson, (1877) 32 Oh. St. 228; Ramsey v. Quillen,
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Against Whom may the Creditor Proceed? This section in
providing that the creditor may act against any person except
a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the
fraud at the time of purchase, or one deriving title from such
purchaser, follows in general the former law in Minnesota. Section 7016, General Statutes 1913, similarly protected purchasers
for value without previous notice of the fraud; while it has been
held that where the purchaser participated in the fraud, the
conveyance could be set aside in toto. 1°3 The uniform act, however, appears to make some minor changes. Thus under the
act, the purchaser to hold the property must give "fair consideration" as defined by section 3, or otherwise he is only entitled
to reimbursement. 10 4 Now section 3 requires a fair equivalent
to constitute a "fair consideration," and in other particulars
may require more than the former rules as to a sufficient consideration. This has been already referred to under section 3.
On the other hand, in the matter of what is good faith, the
uniform act appears to be more favorable to the purchaser. It
has been held in Minnesota that if a purchaser has knowledge
of fa~ts which would put an ordinarily prudent man on inquiry,
this constitutes notice sufficient to set aside the conveyance.105
This section seems to require that the purchaser have knowledge
of the fraud, not merely notice, thus protecting the purchaser
who is negligent and does not exercise the care of the ordinarily
prudent man, but nevertheless acts in good faith. This corresponds to the rule as to holders in due course under the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act.10 6
How may the Creditor Proceed? The section specifies two
ways in which the creditor may proceed: (a) have the conveyance
set aside, or (b) disregard it and attach or levy execution on
the property. These are the methods laid down in the leading
Minnesota case,107 except, of course, that a judgment was formerly a prerequisite to bringing the action to set aside. It is
(1880) 5 Lea (Tenn.) 184; McBee v. Bearden, (1881) 7 Lea (Tenn.) 731
(contingent
claim, not matured.)
3
'°
Thompson v. Bickford, (1872) 19 Minn. 17 (1).
104
Sec. 9 (2).
205Manwaring v. O'Brien, (1899) 75 Minn. 542, 78 N.W. 1; See 27
C.J. 513. 514. In such cases where the purchaser has not been guilty
of actual fraud, the courts have usually granted him reimbursement, See.
Leqve
v. Stoppel, (1896) 64 Minn. 74, 66 N.W. 208; 27 C.J. 671-672, 674.
100
Sec. 56, N.I.L., Minn., G.S. 1913, sec. 5868.
3°0Jackson v. Holbrook, (1887) 36 Minn. 494, 32 N.W. 852, A.S.R.
683. They are also the methods in general use in other states.
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true that the court in that case, mentions three remedies, (1)
to sell on execution and let the purchaser contest the validity of
the title, (2) to bring action to have the conveyance removed
as an obstruction to selling on execution, and then sell after
decree in that action, (3) to bring action to have the conveyance
adjudged void as to the judgment, and have the land sold by
receiver or officer of court. It would seem, however, that (2)
and (3) would both come under (a) of the uniform act, since
they are both actions to set aside the conveyance, except that in
one case the officer of the court sells in the same action, and in the
other case the action is followed by sale on execution. It seems
clear that there is no abolishing of any of the former remedies
by the act, especially in view of section 11. It is remedial legislation and to be broadly construed; it is a re-statement of the
law, and so to be construed; and the Minnesota rule that the
equity action to set aside could be brought in aid of and preceding safe of land on execution at law, is the general one in
the United States.108
For similar reasons it is not to be supposed that the Uniform
Act abolishes garnishment as a method of reaching property
fraudulently conveyed, 10 9 although it is not specifically mentioned.
Many states do not have garnishment statutes under that name;
and in a uniform act the words would naturally be broadly construed to cover the various local forms of remedies. "Attach"
would seem, therefore, in this act, to include "garnish."
It has been held in Minnesota that the title of property
fraudulently conveyed remains in the grantee, even after sale on
execution, until the fraudulent character of the conveyance is
established in legal proceedings. 110 This is contrary to the general
rule that the sale on execution gives title to the purchaser at
the sale."" In view of the words of this section which are that
the creditor may "disregard" the conveyance and levy execution, and of section 12 which requires uniformity of construction
in the different states enacting the law, it may well be that the
court will hold that the rule on this matter has been changed
by the uniform act.
The above section does not specify how the attachment is
to be made, leaving that to the existing law of each state. The
10827 C.J. 719; Glenn, Creditors' Rights and Remedies sec. 77-79.

' 009Benton v. Snyder, (1875) 22 Minn. 247.
" Brasie v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., (1902) 87 Minn. 456, 92 N.W.
340, 94 A.S.R. 709, 67 L.R.A. 865.
1"67 L.R.A. note at 865. 900; 27 C.J. 704; 16 H.L.R. 375.
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attachment affidavit prescribed by statute112 has been used in
practice regularly to apply to cases of constructive fraud, where
there was no actual intent to defraud; and no doubt an affidavit
in the words of the statute, that the debtor has disposed of his
property "with intent to delay or defraud his creditors," will be
held to apply to any conveyance fraudulent under the uniform
act, although it be a conveyance under section 4, 5, 6 or 8, made
without actual intent to defraud. The words of the attachment
statute would be words of art in that they would be construed as
covering whatever conveyances the law of the state may declare
are fraudulent as to creditors.
What Property nay the Creditor Reach? The definition of
"conveyance" in section 1 covers any form of property, and
therefore any property conveyed can be reached under section 9.
The act does not cover such other questions of relief, as the right
of the creditor to an accounting by the transferee for rents and
profits of the property, the right to personal judgment against
the transferee where he has sold the property or mingled it with
his own, the right of the transferee to re-imbursement for taxes
paid and other expenses, incumbrances paid off, etc. On these and
similar points, under section 11 the existing rules of law would
apply.

3

Purchaser's right of reimbursement. The reason for subdivision two of the section, allowing a purchaser who has given
less than fair consideration for the conveyance, to retain the
property as security for repayment, if he had no fraudulent intent, is obvious. Two cases present themselves, first, where the
entire price is inadequate and has been paid, second, where the
price is adequate, but only part has been paid by the purchaser.
As to the former, the rule was in most cases, that inadequate
consideration was evidence of fraud of the purchaser, but if in
fact there was no fraud then the purchaser held the property at
law, but equity permitted the conveyance to stand only as security,
while if there was actual fraud in the purchaser, he had no right
even to reimbursement. 1 4 Under the uniform act, if the price
is inadequate, and the conveyance is otherwise fraudulent under
sections 4 to 8, the purchaser without actual fraudulent intent
may hold the property only as security for repayment under
112Minn., G. S. 1913, sec. 7846, subd. 4.
113 See Diinnell Digest, sec. 3892, 3893, 3930, 3891; also 27 C.J. 670,

668, 855, 675-7.

114Carson v. Hawley, (1901)

544, 545.

82 Minn. 204, 210, 84 N.W. 746, 27 C.J.
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section 9 (2), while a purchaser having such fraudulent intent
may not have reimbursement. This appears to involve some
change in the form of stating the law, rather than in its substance, and has been referred to under section 3. In many cases
before the uniform act, the same result was reached by apparently
somewhat different reasoning, the conveyance being held constructively fraudulent because of the inadequate price, in which
case the purchaser could hold the property as security for the
inadequate price paid, which could not be done if the purchase
was actually fraudulent.11 5 The advantage of the act is to make
the rule clear and uniform.
As to the second case, of part payment by the purchaser in
good faith before discovery of the fraud, the rule under subdivision two of this section and under section 3, which defines
"fair consideration" as the conveyance of property which is a
fair equivalent by the purchaser, not merely a promise to pay,
seems to be that in such case there is no "fair consideration,"
and that the purchaser may not pay the rest of the price after he
discovers the fraud, but may only hold the property as security
for repayment of the installments already paid. This was also
apparently the former rule. 16
"Section 10. [Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have Not
Matured.] Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim has not matured he may
proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction against any person
against whom he could have proceeded had his claim matured,
and the court may,
"(a) 1 "7Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property,
"(b) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property,
"(c) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or
"(d) Make any order which the circumstances of the case
may require."
The change which this section and the preceding one appear
to make in the rule that the creditor ordinarily must secure judgment before bringing action to set aside the conveyance, has
already been discussed under section 9. The cases of creditors
whose claims have not matured, securing court protection where
there has been a fraudulent conveyance, are not so numerous as
1"527 C.J. 671, 672; 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 222, note; Griswold v. Szwanek,
(1908) 82 Neb. 761, 118 N.W. 1073, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 222. See Leqve
v. Stoppel, (1896) 64 Minn. 74, 83, 66 N.W. 208.
116Crockett v. Phinney, (1885) 33 Minn. 153, 22 N.W. 289; Riddell
v. Munro,
(1892) 49 Minn. 532, 52 N.W. 141.
117
1n Minn., Laws 1921, ch. 415, (a) is printed (2) by some mistake.
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cases where the claims have matured but have not been reduced
to judgment,"1 8 but they are not unknown. 10 Where a creditor
has a note not yet due, and the debtor has conveyed his property
fraudulently, the creditor may well require protection in the
form of an order preventing the transferee from further dealing
with the property; and lack of such an order at the time might
well cause the creditor loss of ability to collect his debt when it
matured, and therefore irreparable damage.' 2 The words in this
section, as contrasted with the preceding one, are "the court may."
It is in the discretion of the court to grant the preliminary relief,
the nature of which is outlined in the act.
"Section 11. [Cases Not Provided for in Act.] In any
case not provided for in this Act the rules of law and equity
including the law merchant, and in particular the rules relating
to the law of principal and agent, and the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake, bankruptcy or other
invalidating cause shall govern."
The section provides, what would largely be true in its 'absence, that the act shall be construed in relation to the common
law and law merchant. Such a section is found generally in the
uniform acts. Reference has already been made under the various
sections to a number of doctrines and rules which probably continue in force, because not mentioned in the act, and not covered
by it. Many more such rules could be enumerated.
"Section 12. [Construction of Act.] This act shall be so
interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it."
This section is found in the various uniform acts. Judicial
construction is a large part of any legislation, if not the largest
part, and is especially important in applying the present act. The
advantages of uniformity can only be achieved if the courfs
in the different states construe the act alike. Otherwise there
can be just as confusing diversity in the law, as if the statute
itself was worded differently in the separate states.
"18 Statutes permitting actions to set aside without first securing judgment have been construed to apply only to matured claims. 27 C.J. 736
note 38: 5 Encyc. P1. & Pr. 477, note 4.
119Thus the Tennessee code has allowed an accommodation indorser
or surety to sue out an attachment against the property of the principal
who has fraudulently conveyed his property, as security for his liability,
whether the debt on which he is bound be due or not. McBee v. Bearden,
(1881) 7 Lea (Tenn.) 731.
12-For an instance of preliminary injunction against fraudulent conveyances being allowed, see Minn., G.S. 1913, sec. 7889.
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"Section 13. [Name of Act.] This act may be cited as the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act."
By taking advantage of this section to cite the act by its
nationally known name, and by using the section numbers of
the act in referring to its provisions, judges and lawyers will
make their references easily understood anywhere in the United
States. Uniformity of reference to the act and its provisions are
a decided advantage in its use.
"Section 14. [Inconsistent Legislation Repealed.] Sections
7010 and 7013 of General Statutes, 1913, are hereby repealed, and
all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed; but sections 7011, 7012, 7017 and 7018 of General Statutes, 1913, are not repealed."
The sections of the General Statutes which are superseded
by the uniform act and by it expressly repealed, as well as those
mentioned as not repealed, have been discussed at the beginning
under the heading Scope of the Act.221

Such sections of the

statutes as are partly repealed, and not mentioned in the act,
were also there referred to.
"Section 15. This act shall take effect on the first day of
January, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two."
12lSee 7 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 455-59.

